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We  consider  the  channel  consisting  in  transferring  the  credit  risk  associated  with  refinancing 
operations between financial institutions to market participants. In particular, we analyze liquidity and 
volatility premia on the French government debt securities market, since these assets are used as 
collateral both in the open market operations of the ECB and on the interbank market. In our time-
varying transition probability Markov-switching (TVTP-MS) model, we highlight the existence of two 
regimes. In one of them, which we refer to as the conventional regime, monetary policy neutrality is 
verified; in the other, which we dub the unconventional regime, monetary policy operations lead to 
volatility  and  liquidity  premia  on  the  collateral  market.  The  existence  of  these  conventional  and 
unconventional regimes highlights some asymmetries in the conduct of monetary policy. 
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Nous étudions les canaux de transmission de risque de crédit associés aux opérations de refinancement 
entre institutions financières et participants au marché. Nous analysons en particulier les effets des 
primes  de  liquidité et  de volatilité sur  le  marché des  titres  publics français. Ceux-ci  sont  utilisés 
comme collatéral dans les OMO’s de la BCE et sur le marché inter bancaire. A l’aide d’un modèle de 
Markov à probabilité de transition variable, nous mettons en évidence deux régimes : le premier, le 
régime conventionnel, est caractérisé par la neutralité de la politique monétaire ; dans le deuxième 
régime, les opérations de politique monétaire conduisent à la mise en évidence d’effets de volatilité et 
de prime de liquidité sur le marché du collatéral. De plus, l'existence de ces deux régimes entraîne une 
implémentation asymétrique de la politique monétaire. 
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Codes JEL: G10; C22; C53 1. Introduction
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the impact of unconventional monetary
policy on the market for collateral, taking the case of the French government debt securities
market. This asset class is used both in the open market operations (OMOs) conducted by
the central bank and on the secured interbank market. Open market operations and repo
operations are subject to credit risk (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), so that collateral is provided
to insure the lender against any default. The value of collateral is marked to market such that
it is not constant throughout the duration of the loan. Market liquidity therefore becomes a
key factor in determining the value of collateral. The aim of the paper is to examine whether
tensions in the re￿nancing process of the banking system and the unconventional monetary
policy implemented during the crisis have turned credit risk into market liquidity risk via
the extensive use of some types of collateral.
Green (2005), for example, shows that the assets eligible as collateral provide lower rates
of return than those not eligible by incurring an opportunity cost to owners. In the context
of the recent ￿nancial crisis, we have observed several adverse phenomena. First, the in-
creased risk associated with interbank re￿nancing created a concentration on the highest
quality eligible collateral, such as government bonds. Second, higher counterparty risk in-
creased the required haircuts on the value of collateral so that larger amounts of collateral
became necessary. Third, increased re￿nancing via the central bank raised the amount of
deposited collateral. Fourth, the stepping-up of numerous re￿nancing operations resulted in
2more frequent aggressive trading of collateral. Finally, the preference for longer-term oper-
ations also required larger amounts of collateral: for example, in 2006, collateral deposited
amounted to EUR 959 billion, versus EUR 1,585 billion in September 2008. Given these
speci￿c circumstances, market neutrality may not always be achieved in the monetary pol-
icy stance, especially vis-à-vis the market for collateral. A large body of the literature has
focused on the market for public debt securities. Diaz et al. (2006), among others, examine
the impact of European Monetary Union (EMU) on the liquidity of Treasury bonds and
market volatility. They conclude that EMU led to sharp falls in volatility and improved ef￿-
ciency in the Spanish Treasury bond market. In the same vein, Dunne et al. (2007) compare
the different European bond segments and show that, contrary to the prevailing market be-
lief, the 10-year segment of the French bond market is a benchmark asset for the European
bond market as a whole. Goldreich et al. (2005) and Fleming (2003) also focus, precisely,
on the liquidity of US Treasuries and its impact on interest rates, as do Chakravarty and
Saskar (1999), who also compare the different bond segments in terms of bid-ask spreads.
Our approach is different from previous papers since we explicitly relate French bond
market dynamics to the ECB's unconventional monetary policy. This is also quite different
from that of some recent work that develops interesting, promising and coherent macroeco-
nomic models of the unconventional monetary policy of central banks. This research, some
of which is an extension of New Keynesian general equilibrium models, is clear and com-
putationally tractable (see among others, Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Curdia and Woodford,
32010). We do not construct a micro founded model for analysing the effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy on the market for collateral, but rather adopt a reduced empirical
assessment of unconventional monetary policy. More speci￿cally, in our paper, we analyze
the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the liquidity (bid-ask spreads) and volatil-
ity (realized bipower variation from Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2004) of the market
for collateral during these unconventional periods. This analysis is based on high-frequency
data identifying all quotes for on-the-run 3-month and 10-year French debt securities be-
tween 2003 and 2009. We selected on-the-run 3-month and 10-year securities for their
representativeness of the short and the long segments of the French market respectively.
We consider a time-varying transition probability Markov-switching vector autoregressive
(TVTP-MS-VAR) model (Filardo and Gordon, 1998). In our case, the transition probabil-
ities are governed both by the cycle of monetary policy operations and the cycle of French
Treasury auctions of 10-year notes and 3-month bills.
Our main ￿ndings are as follows. First, the stepping-up of special re￿nancing operations
with high bid-to-cover ratios makes more probable the emergence of an unconventional
regime in which liquidity and volatility premia appear with, in parallel, the segmentation
of the bond market. Second, regime identi￿cation shows the potential asymmetry in the
monetary policy stance between conventional and unconventional regimes, where the same
decision (for example more frequent open market operations (OMOs) and loose liquidity
provision) may have positive or negative effects depending on the regime markets are in.
4The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we propose a brief review of
the implementation of unconventional monetary policy and of developments in the French
sovereign bond market. In the third section, we de￿ne indicators of liquidity and volatility
and present the models. The fourth section discusses the empirical results and sheds light
on their monetary policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
2. Unconventional monetary policy and the French bond market
In this paper we distinguish between three types of liquidity: central bank liquidity pro-
vided through open market operations; funding liquidity, de￿ned by the BIS (2008) as the
ability of banks to meet their liabilities, and unwind or settle their positions as they become
due; and market liquidity, de￿ned by the IMF (2004) as the ability of investors to trade
quickly, at a fair price and low cost, a large amount of shares with a small impact on prices.
In 2007-2008, we observed in the ￿nancial system: (i) a shortage of funding liquidity; (ii)
a shortage of market liquidity in the funding market; (iii) a shortage of market liquidity
in some other markets. Given this unprecedented context, the ECB, like the other major
central banks, experimented with unconventional monetary policy.
2.1. A brief review of the ECB's unconventional monetary policy
The recent crisis seriously undermined the interbank market so that the ECB decided
to provide huge amounts of liquidity to the banking system through regular and special
5OMOs.
1 With respect to regular open market operations, the ECB ￿rst increased the levels
ofallotmentstomeetliquidityneedsthroughmainre￿nancingoperations(MROs)andlong-
term re￿nancing operations (LTROs). Due to the strong demand for liquidity, the ECB
also decided (i) to use ￿xed-rate tenders with full allotment in order to completely satisfy
banks' liquidity needs; (ii) to introduce very long-term re￿nancing operations with one-year
maturity; (iii) and to conduct several one-off ￿ne-tuning and FX swap operations (Figure
1).
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The proportion of operations outside the regular monetary policy framework has dramat-
1 A detailed description of the regular monetary policy framework is discussed in Idier and Nardelli (2011).
Curdia and Woodford (2010) provide a summary of the effects of the unconventional monetary policy
implemented by the Federal Reserve for the United States. We can use this for the purposes of comparison.
6ically increased during the recent period from 3 to 40%.
2 Moreover, from January 2000
to July 2007 the mean amount of allotted liquidity per operation in special operations was
around EUR 17 billion, compared with around EUR 40 billion between August 2007 and
October 2008. Finally, no exit strategies were put in place afterwards. Looking at the
bid-to-cover ratio
3 before the implementation of unconventional monetary policy, it jumped
from 1.51 in 2006 to 1.82 in 2007 (i.e. from 51% to 82% excess liquidity demand in open
market operations) and plummeted to 1.03 in 2009 following the implementation of the full
allotment procedure (Figure 2).
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All of these operations conducted by the central bank lead to some collateral immobiliza-
tion: to protect the ECB from losses due to open market operations, collateral is deposited
2 Here, we only include liquidity-providing operations.
3 This is de￿ned as the supply-demand ratio for liquidity. It sums up some of the tensions relating to
re￿nancing operations.
7by banks. In the event of default, this collateral may be liquidated by the central bank to
get its money back. The assets used as collateral must meet certain criteria to be eligible
by the ECB (ECB "The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area", November
2008) mainly because their value is marked to market. As a consequence, the ECB, which
is exposed to downward variations in the value of the collateral, uses some additional mea-
sures. First, a haircut, as a percentage discount, is applied to the value of the collateral.
4
Second, margin calls consist in counterparties (banks) providing additional cash to main-
tain the value of the collateral. This creates interactions between the collateral market and
the central bank's re￿nancing operations when unconventional monetary policy undermines
the principle of market neutrality. Here, we focus on the French government debt market.
2.2. The market for collateral: The case of French debt market securities
The amount of the French government's negotiable debt almost doubled between 1998
and 2008, reaching EUR 988 billion at the end of September 2008.
5 This upward trend was
made possible by the introduction of marketable products with a continuum of maturities.
After regular pre-scheduled auctions, securities are actively traded on the secondary market,
where transactions are not centralized. This secondary market is an over-the-counter market
and bilateral transaction details are partially known. It should be noted that we directly
4 The level of the haircut is based on an asset liquidity classi￿cation: the lower the liquidity, the higher the
haircut (see Avouyi-Dovi and Idier, 2010).
5 Curdia and Woodford (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), among others, provide ￿gures regarding the
United States.
8analyze rates, not prices. This is chosen rationally for the purposes of comparison because
we consider several maturities which can be differently compounded according to their
issuance: the actuarial rate is less sensitive to the coupon process than the price of the
bonds. Moreover some differences between rates may be directly related to the organization
of the market since prices are also impacted by the wealth of market intermediaries, or their
inventory risks (Fontaine and Garcia, 2010). While the quoted short-term rate is anchored
to the ECB's minimum bid rate, 10-year rates are more autonomous. As a consequence,
the bond spread shrank up till spring 2008. Following the ￿nancial crisis and the ECB's
decisions to cut interest rates, this bond spread increased, mainly due to the sharp drop in
short-term maturity rates (Figure 3).
OntheEuropeanmarketasawhole, highvolatilityonbondyieldsforshortandlong-term
maturities has been observed since August 2007. Due to governments' ￿scal commitments
aimed at tackling the effects of the crisis and to a general rise in credit risk premia, risk
aversion on bonds over the long term has increased. However, this has not occurred for
all government bonds within the euro area. On the one hand, bonds are suffering from
a ￿ight to quality whereby investors shift trading to the traditionally strong government
debt securities (typically German or French ones). On the other hand, there are also ￿ight
to liquidity issues, with investors wishing to invest in liquid markets. In a period where
re￿nancing is dif￿cult on the interbank market, it is clear that banks are mitigating their risk
by investing in markets where funds may be withdrawn rapidly. This preference for liquid
9and strong collateral during the turmoil, coupled with the change in the conduct of monetary
policy, may create some adverse phenomena. In particular, when market participants focus
on certain types of collateral and the central bank deposit of collateral surges, liquidity and
volatility premia may appear on the market for collateral. In this context, a negative spiral
between the market value of the collateral and the conduct of monetary policy may occur.
This is what we attempt to assess in the following section.
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3. The collateral channel
3.1. Dataset and market indicators
Our dataset consists in high-frequency on-the-run quotes for French debt securities with
103-month and 10-year maturities from Reuters Data Tick History; the sample period goes
from January 1, 2003 to July 31, 2009. We have around 3.5 million quotes for these bonds.
Some public holidays were removed from the sample due to lack of trading (Christmas,
New Year's Eve, Easter, France's national holiday, etc.). Due to the greater dispersion of
3-month contracts, with more frequent auctions, the number of quotes is lower than for
10-year notes, in the case of on-the-run contracts.
3.1.1.Liquidity indicators
Following Fleming (2003), we consider that quoted spreads are ef￿cient measures for
tracking liquidity on this market. This measure is used in many markets and allows for
comparisons such as in Chordia et al. (2003). In practice, the larger the spread, the higher
the transaction costs. Assuming that the true value of the asset is between the bid and ask
prices, the larger the spread, the greater the potential gap between this true value and the
price investors have to pay for buying or selling it. We construct an average daily bid-ask
spreadforeachrate. Sincewearelookingatthebid-askspreadforrates, whichareinversely















Due to the partial information available in our dataset (e.g. no details about transaction
volumes), we restrict our analysis to this standard indicator as suggested by Fleming (2003).
Figure 4 presents the bid-ask spread for the two maturities between January 2003 and July
2009. The short-term maturity bond is less liquid than the longer-term one over the sample.
The average bid-ask spread for 3-month maturity rates is about 4 bp, while it falls to 1.1 bp
for the 10-year one.
7 Broadly on the sample, the bid-ask spread for the short-term maturity
fell except during the crisis of 2008 where it jumped twice in September and October.
Figure 4 :  Quoted bid-ask spreads for 3 month French bond rate (upper panel) and 10-year 
French Bond rate (lower panel), basis point.
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6 We also de￿ned the daily spread as the median of spreads over a given day. This does not affect the
results. See Krishnamurthy (2010) for a brief review of measures of liquidity.
7 This is also con￿rmed by the relative bid-ask spreads.
123.1.2.Volatility measures
Realized volatility uses the intraday returns on an asset to calculate daily volatility mea-
sures by approximation of the quadratic variation. There are several realized volatility es-
timators (Wright and Zhou, 2009). This class of non-parametric volatility estimators is
particularly well-suited to our analysis since our dataset consists of high-frequency data. In
particular, realized volatility estimators take into account some speci￿c characteristics of ￿-
nancial markets such as the presence of microstructure noise which stems from the frictions
observed on the market when high frequency data are considered. For example, transactions
are not continuous on the market; there is a bid-ask spread so that at least two prices are
available; the size of this spread depends on the size of the tick; or market liquidity in￿u-
ences the price discovery process. All of this makes the true price process unobservable and
estimators of volatility have to deal with these sources of noise to obtain unbiased estimates
of the variance.
For on-the-run bond data, the bipower variation from Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard
(2004) is particularly well-suited since the changes in bond contracts when a new auc-
tion occurs (since we are looking at on-the-run contracts) may produce jumps in the price
process. However, bipower variation is robust to these jumps such that we can also compare
on-the-run rate volatilites at different maturities even if auctions are not synchronous.
8 This
8 Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) show, for instance, that realized power variation, realized bipower
variation and realized variance are general measures for the quadratic variation process. However, only
realized power variation and realized bipower variation are robust to rare jumps.
13consistency even in the presence of jumps does not apply in the case of the standard realized
volatility estimator de￿ned as the daily sum of squared returns.
Let us consider a partition ￿ of the day using the last transaction into equal sub-intervals







where rm;i and rm;i￿ are subsequent returns for the considered sub-intervals of day t; for
maturity m: Realized volatility (reported in Figure 5) also surged during the crisis episodes.
9
We note that the impact is greater for the 3-month maturity than for 10-year bonds. Indeed,
volatility for long-term bonds rose but did not soar.
Figure 5 :  Realized Volatility estimators for 3 month French bond rate (upper panel) and 
10-year French Bond rate (lower panel), annualized %.
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9 For the sake of convenience, three huge peaks in Fig. 5 (in October 2008 with levels around 2800) have
been left out of the graph.
143.1.3.Bond issuance indicators
The French bond market offers assets grouped into three categories based on their ini-
tial maturities. The ￿rst category comprises the short-term bond class with maturities less
than one year. In this category, 3-month maturity bonds are typically issued weekly and re-
spond to short-term ￿nancing needs. The second category includes bonds with 2- or 5-year
maturities with a new auction per month. The last category consists of long-term bonds
with maturity from 7 to 50 years, also with one auction per month. It is widely accepted
that a 10-year bond is a good representative of long-term bonds on French markets. One
main development in this market is its internationalization. An increasing share of nego-
tiable French debt is held by foreign investors: by mid-2008, this share represented 62%,
compared with 18.8% at the end of 1998. This internationalization has been a vector of
increasing liquidity on the market with a wider pool of market participants. In the euro
area, this confers on the French market a benchmark status (Dunne et al., 2007). Moreover,
during crisis episodes, unlike the German market, its intermediate status vis-a-vis peripheral
countries guarantees its liquidity.
Since our dataset consists of real-time quotations of on-the-run bonds we need to control
for new auctions by using dummy variables when the bond contract changes for a given
maturity. We thus de￿ne a dummy variable, noted AFTm;t, which is equal to one when new
bonds for maturity m are issued by the French Treasury, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we
take the bid-to-cover ratio of these auctions noted AFT_coverm;t to illustrate the intensity
15of demand.
10
3.1.4.Unconventional monetary policy indicators
To investigate monetary policy, we construct several indicators representing the ECB's
operational framework: a set of dummy variables for OMOs (noted OMOt, which have
the value of 1 on OMO announcement days and zero otherwise
11) and the associated bid-
to-cover ratio (noted OMO_covert). The choice of these two variables is motivated by the
fact that:
- the dummy variables OMOt account both for the usual open market operations
regularlyscheduledandtheabilityoftheECBtoincreasethefrequencyofliquidity-providing
operations in the event of a perceived liquidity shortage;
- the bid-to-cover ratio both summarizes the ability of monetary authorities to struc-
turally increase the benchmark allotments (loose monetary policy) and the intensity of de-
mand from ￿nancial institutions. This is one main difference compared with some other
indicators. For example, the use of allotted amounts, since it only captures the supply of
liquidity by the ECB does not a priori represent the demand intensity in the event of inef￿-
cient demand (e.g. higher than the benchmark allotment in the event of overbidding). The
same comment applies to the number of bidders, which only concerns increasing demand
without considering the reluctance of the ECB to increase the benchmark or not.
10 All these data are publicly available on the French Treasury's website (http://www.aft.gouv.fr)
11 For a detailed description of the open market announcement process, see Appendix 1.
16In other words, the bid-to-cover ratio associated with open market operation dummies
gives good insight into both demand for and supply of central bank liquidity. All these in-
dicators measure the intensity with which market participants are seeking re￿nancing from
the central bank and how the monetary authorities comply with this demand for money. The
descriptive statistics performed on stationary variables (Appendix 2) and presented in Table
1 genuinely give us a good intuition of the links between market volatility and collateral
liquidity and the conduct of monetary policy. We report the mean and standard error of
our indicators (volatility and liquidity) depending on whether an open market operation is
announced or not, and divide the sample into pre- and post-2007.
Table 1 shows that bond volatility tends to increase when OMOs are announced, especially
during tensions (here broadly speaking after 2007). On the liquidity side, different effects
appear depending on the maturity of the bond. On the one hand, quoted spreads increase
when an OMO is announced for the 10-year rate (OMOt = 1). On the other hand, the
spread of the 3-month rate decreases when OMOt = 1 before August 2007 and increases
after august 2007. These features of bonds markets ￿rst argue for an econometric model
with regime switching since crisis episodes tend to change the dynamics of liquidity and
volatility on the market (as in Krishnamurthy, 2010). Second these regimes seem to be
highly in￿uenced by the conduct of monetary policy so that the transition probabilities of
the models depend on monetary policy indicators as previously de￿ned.
17OMO t  120,t  3,t !S120,t !S3,t
0 10.2790 12.5177 -0.0004 0.0229
1 11.1742 18.2558 0.0040 -0.0449
0 1.5067 2.6286 0.2985 0.9170
1 1.6887 3.3190 0.5564 2.5578
0 9.8229 12.7131 -0.0021 0.0422
1 9.1177 13.6214 0.0050 -0.1271
0 1.4603 2.3136 0.1058 0.8738
1 1.5233 2.4235 0.1216 1.0665
0 11.4086 12.0801 0.0036 -0.0213
1 13.1754 23.1425 0.0031 0.0216
0 1.5807 3.3552 0.5183 1.0091
1 1.7188 3.8939 0.7410 3.3056
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for annualized volatilities and spread variations after and before 





















































We now provide a brief description of the model used to evaluate the impact of uncon-
ventional monetary policy on this particular market for collateral, based on the foregoing
analysis.
3.2.1.A time-varying transition probability Markov-switching model
Let us consider the Markov-switching vector autoregressive (MS-VAR) model. Thus,
conditional on fXkgk=1:t, the history of past variables up to and including t. We separately
implement the two following MS-VAR models (Chan et al., 2011) for 10-year (eq. 3) and
3-month (eq. 4) dynamics respectively:
12
12 In order to ensure convergence properties, we do not consider a uni￿ed model for the two maturities.
Moreover, to limit the number of parameters to be estimated, we con￿ne our analysis to two states. Therefore,
for each maturity, the model allows for two states indexed by a latent non-observable variable which takes






















































A + ￿(st) + ut; (4)
with st a latent non-observable variable (if we assume that there are two states then
st = 1;2 for instance) and with "t and ut following a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and state dependent variance-covariance matrices ￿"(st) and ￿u(st) respectively. Note that
considering the state dependent variances allows for a mixture of Gaussian distributions that
replicates the skewed and leptokurtotic distribution of bond yield variations. Following Fi-
lardo and Gordon (1998) or Henry (2009), we propose a time-varying transition probability
model to explicitly identify factors which can drive changes in the transition probabilities.
More precisely, the transition matrix depends on both the monetary policy cycle and the
French government bond auction cycle. The choice of these variables results from several
constraints. First, the model's frequency and the daily market dynamics do not make it
possible to include macroeconomic variables. Second, for institutional reasons, monetary
and bond cycles are highly in￿uenced by their auction processes. Finally, given the issue
of the impact of monetary policy on some alternative markets, the liquidity of the funding
process and of the bond market needs to be controlled for these substantial institutional fea-
tures. We thus consider both dummy variables and the bid-to-cover ratios resulting from the
corresponding auctions to disentangle two possible effects:
191. We assume that the frequency of open market operations responds to re￿nancing
demand from banks. In the same vein, the scheduled debt market cycle is assumed to
provide liquidity to the corresponding bond market segment.
2. However, if the greater frequency of OMOs is combined with higher bid-to-cover
ratios it reveals dif￿culties for banks in obtaining re￿nancing. For the same reasons, high
bid-to-cover ratios for debt auctions may reveal excess demand for this class of assets.




pm;11(t) 1 ￿ pm;22(t)




pm;ii(t) = ￿(￿i + ￿i:OMO(t ￿ 1) + ￿i:AFTm(t ￿ 1) +
￿i:OMO_cover(t ￿ 1) + ￿i:AFT_coverm(t ￿ 1));
and ￿ being the cumulative normal density function (Kim et al., 2008).
13 The transition
probabilities pm;ii;i = 1;2 are non-negative and range from 0 to 1. Note that we include
lagged explanatory variables to remove any endogeneity issues. The set of unknown para-
meters ￿ comprises the mean equation parameters, the parameters of variance-covariance
matrices and the parameters used in the time-varying transition probability equations. These
parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood based on a sample of T obser-
13 The results presented below are robust to some other transition probability functions which guarantee
a well-de￿ned likelihood function. For example, Henry (2009) suggests the logistic functional form for





ln(f(xt j fXkgk=1:t￿1)): (6)
The Gaussian density f(xt j fXkgk=1:t￿1) considers the two states of the Markov-switching
process as:
f(xt j fXkgk=1:t￿1) =
2 X
￿ s=1
f(xt j st = ￿ s)Pr(st = ￿ s j fXkgk=1:t￿1);
with f(xt j st = ￿ s) the density conditional on state ￿ s ( ￿ s = 1 or 2) and Pr(st = ￿ s j






with ￿ the Hadamard product, ￿ a (2￿1) vector of ones, Am(t) the transition matrix de￿ned
in equation (5) and f(xt) a (1 ￿ 2) vector with elements f(xt j st = ￿ s): For the robust-
ness checks, we further apply likelihood-based tests and the Regime Classi￿cation Measure
(RCM). These tests are detailed in Appendix 3. More precisely, we compare multi-regime
models (the FTP-VAR model and TVTP-VAR model) with a single model (VAR model) in
terms of the likelihood ratio and RCM statistics. Clearly, the FTP-VAR model performs bet-
ter than the VAR model whereas the TVTP-VAR outperforms over the FTP-VAR one (the
detailed results of these robustness checks are reported in Appendix 3). Model estimations
are presented and discussed in the next section.
214. The asymmetric impact of monetary policy
4.1. The monetary policy cycle and regime identi￿cation
The ￿ltered probabilities for the two regimes are presented in Figure 6 and estimated
coef￿cients of transition probabilities in Table 2. As mentioned above, the debt market
cycle and monetary policy cycle are used to identify these two regimes. The coef￿cients of
transition probabilities of the unconventional regime (regime 1) are signi￿cant for both the
10-year and the 3-month rates at the 5% level of con￿dence, except for the bid-to-cover ratio
in the case of the long-term maturity. However, the magnitudes and signs of the coef￿cients
depend on the maturity. Indeed, in absolute value, the coef￿cients of the 3-month equation
are higher than those relating to the one for the 10-year rate. Therefore, the reaction of
the short-term maturity to bond issuance indicators or to unconventional policy indicators
is more aggressive. For the conventional regime, the variable representing OMOs does not
impact the probability of transition of the 10-year rate, whereas it has a signi￿cant effect
on this probability for the 3-month rate at the 5% con￿dence level. On the other hand, the
effects of bond issuance on the transition probabilities for both the short and long-term rates
are quite similar. Furthermore, it is worth noting that there are some discrepancies between
the probabilities of regimes 1 and 2: the estimated coef￿cients show the differences in their
sign and magnititude regardless of the maturity.
How can we interpret these results? As reported in Figure 6, regime 1 concerns the
22Figure 6 :  Filtered probabilities for each regime (conventional and unconventional)
extracted from TVTP-VAR models







January 03 January 04 January 05 January 06 January 07 January 08 January 09







January 03 January 04 January 05 January 06 January 07 January 08 January 09







January 03 January 04 January 05 January 06 January 07 January 08 January 09







January 03 January 04 January 05 January 06 January 07 January 08 January 09
2007/2008 period of turmoil but it also encompasses early 2005 and 2006, when special
OMOs on the interbank market were conducted by the ECB,
14 and when monetary cycles
reversed in response to increases in policy interest rates.
The impact of the frequency of OMOs may be considered in different ways. On the one
hand, the frequency of OMOs is supposed to respond to the funding needs of the banking
system so that their frequency smooths possible disruptions to the ￿nancial system. On
the other hand, if these operations are combined with a high bid-to-cover ratio, two effects
may be expected (Jordan and Jordan, 1997; Krishnamurthy, 2002): (i) a high bid-to-cover
ratio may reveal a lack of funding liquidity and the fact that the ECB is not responding
14 This followed implementation of the new operational framework in March 2004 (Idier and Nardelli,
2011).
23Unconventional Conventional Unconventional Conventional
Pr(st+1=1|st=1) Pr(st+1=2|st=2) Pr(st+1=1|st=1) Pr(st+1=2|st=2)
  0.335
   1.15
     -2.35
   1.167
  
OMOt -1.33
   0.218 OMOt -11.05
   -0.697
  
AFTt -3.93
   4.86
   AFTt -2.88
   3.01
  
OMOcovert 1.16
   -0.388 OMOcovert 13.07
   0.652
  
AFTcovert -0.076 -3.33
   AFTcovert 6.12
   -0.479
  
Table 2: 
Model for  !r120,t Model for  !r3,t
Transition probability estimates for   r120 and   r3.                                                     
(**) denotes significance at the 5% level confidence and (*) at the 10% level
suf￿ciently to liquidity needs; (ii) however, it may also reveal that the central bank is only
meeting ef￿cient demand ('ef￿cient' would mean what is calculated as benchmark supply
by the central bank), without replacing the interbank market.
Looking at the impact of monetary and bond cycles in these regimes in Table 2, the
impact of OMOs is twofold. In regime 2, which is the conventional one, the impact of
the frequency of OMOs and the bid-to-cover ratio of these operations are insigni￿cant for
the 10-year rate, thus preserving the market neutrality of monetary policy implementation.
However, this is not true for the 3-month rate: the more frequent the OMOs, the lower the
probability of staying in the conventional regime (coef￿cient equal to -0.697). Moreover,
when the bid-to-cover ratio is low in these more frequent OMOs (i.e. the ECB satis￿es all
bids posted by banks during the auction), the conventional regime is also less persistent (co-
ef￿cient equal to 0.652). This tends to bear out the hypothesis mentioned in the early part
24of the paper: By stepping up OMOs and ensuring higher allotment, the central bank may
encourage the switch from a conventional regime to an unconventional one by affecting the
market used for collateral and triggering market inef￿ciencies. However, our ￿ndings con-
cerning the impact of monetary policy on bond markets indicate some asymmetric results
in the unconventional regime. When this regime occurs, more frequent OMOs combined
with low bid-to-cover ratios (i.e. a loose liquidity policy) make the unconventional regime
less persistent. This result is crucial since it introduces an asymmetry in the conduct of
monetary policy: on the one hand, policy-makers should limit OMOs and supply limited
liquidity to prevent a switch from the conventional to the unconventional regime. On the
other hand, if a crisis occurs, by stepping up OMOs and minimizing the bid-to-cover ratio
of these operations, they reduce the persistence of the crisis regime.
To sum up, regime identi￿cation via transition probabilities highlights the dif￿culty of
managing monetary policy since identical measures may have "good" or "bad" effects de-
pending on the regime markets are in. To limit the switch from a conventional to an un-
conventional regime, OMOs should not be increased and the supply of liquidity should be
limited. However, to limit the persistence of the crisis regime, OMOs should be stepped up
and satisfy demand for funding liquidity.
Regarding bond market cycles (i.e. the effects of AFTt and AFT_covert), theeffects are
less ambiguous than for the monetary policy cycle (see sections above). This is certainly
due to the fact that the auction schedule is very rigid both in terms of frequency and the
25auction process used. As a consequence, when an auction is held, the persistence of the
unconventional regime decreases and the persistence of the conventional regime increases
for both rates. Lower bid-to-cover ratios for these operations also have the positive effect of
limiting the probability of a switch from the conventional to the unconventional regime and
of shortening the unconventional regime in the case of the 3-month rate.
4.2. Market inef￿ciencies, volatility and liquidity premia in the two regimes
The detailed comments on the estimated TVTP-MS-VAR model only relate to the equa-
tions of the 10-year and the 3-month rates (Table 3, columns 3 and 8). In each regime,
conventional and unconventional, collateral market dynamics are statistically different, as
shown in the robustness checks reported in Appendix 3.
If we look at the 10-year rate in Table 3, we observe in the unconventional regimes the
emergence of a liquidity premium (the estimated coef￿cients are signi￿cant with values of
0.797 and 1.112) indicating a higher rate when liquidity becomes scarce. This is in line with
Longstaff (2002), who shows that ￿ight-to-liquidity phenomena in bond markets may affect
yield levels. In the conventional regime, we do not observe this premium (null or signi￿cant
but negligible effect). However, a volatility premium is signi￿cant for this regime at the 5%
level of con￿dence (1.14). This persistent volatility premium in the conventional regime
can be compared to some extent to a GARCH in mean effect, with an increase in the rate
stemming from a rise in volatility.
26 r120,t ln(!120,t)  S120,t  r3,t  r120,t ln(!120,t)  S120,t  r3,t
 r120,t-1 0.327
   -0.032
   -0.034
   0.237  r120,t-1 0.183
   0.004
   0.001 0.007
 
 r120,t-2 -0.190
   0.039
   -0.024
  0.341
    r120,t-2 -0.096
   -0.008
   0.0001 -0.01
ln(!120,t-1) -0.454 0.251 -0.21
   -1.44 ln(!120,t-1) 1.14
   0.501
   0.029
   -0.135
ln(!120,t-2) -0.132 0.449
   -0.03 -1.59 ln(!120,t-2) 0.105 0.219
   -0.011 -0.285
 
 S120,t-1 0.797
   -0.075 -0.472
   0.289  S120,t-1 -0.028 0.066
   -0.308
   0.071
 S120,t-2 1.112
   0.016 -0.420
   2.58
    S120,t-2 -0.078
   -0.021 -0.174
   0.28
 
 r3,t-1 0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.03  r3,t-1 -0.077
   -0.004
  0.008
   -0.136
  
 r3,t-2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.347
    r3,t-2 0.085





   6.58
   µ -2.46
   0.649
   -0.04 1.06
  
R² 0.14 0.14 0.37 0.35 R² 0.08 0.54 0.25 0.42
 r3,t  r120,t  r3,t ln(!3,t)  S3,t  r120,t
 r3,t-1 -0.063 -0.017
   0.022 0.003  r3,t-1 -0.13
   -0.006 0.008 -0.029
 r3,t-2 -0.31
   -0.022
   0.095
   0.036  r3,t-2 -0.354
   -0.007 -0.005 0.041
ln(!3,t-1) -1.25 0.12 1.25
   -0.407 ln(!3,t-1) -0.19
   0.477
   -0.021 0.138
ln(!3,t-2) -1.75 0.102 -1.32
   -0.94
   ln(!3,t-2) -0.131
   0.290
   0.032 0.091
 S3,t-1 0.086 -0.005 0.207
   0.033  S3,t-1 -0.192
   -0.01 -0.138
   -0.006
 S3,t-2 -0.34 -0.011 -0.37
   0.241
    S3,t-2 -0.174
   -0.011 -0.063
   -0.128
 
 r120,t-1 1.08
   -0.033 0.304
   0.350
    r120,t-1 0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.221
  
 r120,t-2 0.032 -0.057 -0.239
   0.055  r120,t-2 0.023 0.002 -0.004 -0.13
  
µ 8.62
   3.05
   0.347 3.18
   µ 0.769
   0.554
   -0.04 -0.54
  
R² 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.21 R² 0.34 0.54 0.05 0.07
Table 3:  Vector autoregressive models estimates under each regimes,                                               
(conventional and unconventional) for   r120 and   r3.                                                                                                   



































Regime 1: unconventional Regime 2: conventional
In the case of the 3-month segment, premia in conventional regimes are positive on prices
(negative on rates with coef￿cients estimated at -0.192 and -0.174 ): when liquidity is abun-
dant (narrow bid-ask spread), investors are willing to pay higher prices for these assets. This
is in line with the standard liquidity premium documented for on-the-run bonds as in Garcia
and Fontaine (2010) for example.
15 We also note a weak but signi￿cant effect of volatility
in this case. In the unconventional regime, liquidity seems less of a concern for investors
maybe because they are closer to the liquidation of their contracts. To some extent, the
distinct effect between regime 1 and regime 2 can be related to the ￿ndings of Jordan and
15 The liquidity premium is a factor that has proved to be of interest for bond prices (Amihud and
Mendelson, 1991; Chakravarty and Saskar, 1999; Elton and Green, 1998).
27Jordan (1997).
Regarding market comovements, the two rates seem to be segmented during uncon-
ventional regimes (for instance there is no effect of the 3-month rate on the 10-year rate
equation), while market comovements are signi￿cant in the conventional one (coef￿cient
estimated at -0.077 and 0.085 in the conventional regime). Comovements in this regime are
signi￿cant and positive, both from long to short-term rates and vice versa. This illustrates
French sovereign bond market dynamics as whole. Therefore, bond market segmentation
may be a signal that reveals the emergence of an unconventional regime.
These comments are valid under a ceteris paribus hypothesis, since VAR results should
be interpreted by taking into account all variable interactions. Finally, in order to complete
and reinforce our empirical results, we perform the regime dependent impulse response
functions (IRF). Here, we follow the methodology implemented by Ehrmann, Ellisson and
Valla (2003) using within impulse response functions "à la " Pesaran and Shin (1998). The
results are reported in Appendix 4. It con￿rms our previous results with
- market segmentation when the unconventional regime occurs;
- the appearance of liquidity premium for long-term bonds, while this premium dis-
appears for short-term bonds
In addition, IRF reveal a strong interaction between liquidity and volatility dynamics
during the unconventional regime. Higher volatility leads to higher spreads: these liquidity
andvolatility feedbacks are stronglyreinforced in the unconventionalregime and accentuate
28the premia observed in rates. In particular, the fact that market illiquidity leads to higher
volatility for the 10-year rate, and vice-versa, is crucial since the use of French bonds as
collateral for re￿nancing operations may expose borrowers to more frequent margin calls
and undermine their ￿nancial soundness along the lines described in the Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) model.
5. Conclusion
This paper considers the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the market for
collateral, in particular the market for French government debt securities. We focus on
3-month and 10-year rates in terms of price, volatility and liquidity linked to monetary
policy cycles and bond auction cycles. This is made possible by the analysis of all quotes
of on-the-run bonds between 2003 and 2009 in order to compute the bipower variation of
the rate dynamics and the market liquidity of the two debt securities via bid-ask spreads.
The interactions between these different indicators are (i) captured via the speci￿cation of
transition probabilities and the estimation of a TVTP-VAR model and (ii) interpreted via
the impulse response functions.
TheTVTP-VARdetectstworegimesinthedata: anunconventionalregimeandaconven-
tional one. The unconventional regime is characterized by the non-neutrality of monetary
policy conduct with respect to the market for collateral. This regime is characterized by
higher liquidity-volatility feedback and market segmentation between the 3-month rate and
29the 10-year rate. However, the persistence of this unconventional regime may be reduced
by stepping up OMOs and ensuring a low bid-to-cover ratio (i.e. a loose liquidity policy).
This policy issue is however asymmetric since the same monetary policy stance, i.e. more
OMOs and loose liquidity, in the conventional regime increases the probability of switching
from the conventional to the unconventional regime. In particular, the fact that the monetary
policy stance is based on the market neutrality assumption poses a new risk in the re￿nanc-
ing process when the unconventional regime occurs. There is, in this regime, the potential
for monetary policy to impact on some markets whose assets are used as collateral. Banks
are therefore exposed to higher risk with collateralized loans if margin calls are required or
if haircuts increase.
This highlights the dif￿culty for central banks in implementing an optimal liquidity pol-
icy due to these asymmetries in expected effects. The detection of which regime is prevail-
ing in order to determine the appropriate monetary policy stance is challenging. It is even
more challenging now, since the question remains as to whether the prevailing regime is a
conventional or unconventional one. A return to market neutrality may however constitute
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Appendix 1: Open market announcements, timing and de￿nition.
The ECB and the national central banks announce open market operations publicly one
day before the deadline for bid submissions by eligible counterparties (banks). This public
announcement is then followed by 5 subsequent steps:
1. tender announcement: (a) announcement by the ECB through public wire services
and (b) announcement by national central banks through national wire services and directly
to individual counterparties (if deemed necessary);
2. counterparties' preparation and submission of bids;
3. compilation of bids by the Eurosystem;
4. tender allotment and announcement of tender results: (a) ECB allotment decision
and (b) announcement of the allotment result;
5. certi￿cation of individual allotment results and settlement of the transactions.
In particular, the ECB's announcement provides publicly the following information: the
reference number of the operation, the date of the operation, the type of operation, the
maturity of the operation, the type of auction, the allotment method, the intended operation
volume, the ￿xed rate (only for ￿xed-rate tenders), the min/max interest rate, the currency
of the operation, the exchange rate (in the case of foreign exchange swaps), the maximum
bid limit, the minimum individual allotment (if any), the minimum allotment ratio, and the
time schedule of the submission.
35Appendix 2: Stationary tests
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin tests are
performed (Table A.1).








Table A.1: ADF and KPSS test statistics
(*) Validates the stationary hypothesis at the 5% level.
36Appendix 3: Robustness checks
For robustness, we can test (i) that the TVTP-model performs better than a ￿xed transi-
tion probability (FTP) model or a standard VAR model
16 and (ii) that our restriction for a
two-state Markov chain is robust. On the basis of the estimated likelihoods, we consider
Vuong's (1989) model selection tests. Let us consider two competing models with densities




























^ ￿T is the heteroskedastic and autocorrelated adjusted variance of the test de￿ned as:





























similar to a Newey and West (1987) correction with autocorrelation of order J.
model for maturity m = 3 m = 120








Table A.2: Vuong (1989) selection model test results, (*) indicates rejection of the null: "models are equivalent"
The Vuong test (Table A.2) shows that regime-switching VAR models are better than
16 The VAR and FTP-VAR model estimates are not reported in this paper but are available on request.
37simple VAR models
17 . It also shows that time-varying transition probability VAR models,
in particular for the 10-year rate, perform better than ￿xed transition probability models.
In addition, we also apply the RCM statistics from Ang and Bekeart (2002) to check if the
two regimes in the TVTP-VAR models are clearly identi￿ed compared to a FTP-VAR. This







so that it is bounded between 0 and 100 and indicates that the lower the statistics, the better
identi￿cation for the regimes we have.
model for maturity m = 3 m = 120
RCM for FTP-VAR 2.42 5.69
RCM for TVTP-VAR 2.25 3.74
Table A.3: RCM statistics for regime identi￿cation
The results in Table A.3 indicate better regime identi￿cation for both rates using time-
varying transition probability models.
17 Due to the presence of unidenti￿ed nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis (a single regime),
we cannot use the Chi2 distribution to determine the signi￿cance of the likelihood ratio tests (see for
instance, Cho and White, 2007). Therefore, these results should be interpreted with cautious. However
given the support obtained by the RCM tests, the rejection of the VAR model in favour of a MS-VAR or a
TVTP-MS-VAR seems robust.
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